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What People Know
What does the public know, and how much do they care, about Arctic environmental change? 
What do their patterns of awareness and concern imply for science communication? Such 
questions motivate research that began in 2006 with a “polar module” of knowledge and concern 
items on the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS). Responses to that survey display levels of public 
concern that might be encouraging, but have a darker side as well. Political orientation influences 
how people answer every concern question, from the Inuit way of life to preserving Antarctica 
for science (Hamilton 2008). Education and science knowledge matter too, but the effects of  
education and knowledge vary with political beliefs. Among liberal and moderate respondents, 
for example, expressed concern about polar change increases with education. Among the most 
conservative respondents, however, concern decreases with education. Figure 1 illustrates this 
relationship with a survey question about sea level rise.
Figure 1: Probability that people say they would care “a great deal” if sea levels rose 20 feet, flooding 
coastal areas. Calculated from a logit regression analysis with adjustments for gender, age, income, and 
five indicators of science knowledge (Hamilton 2008). Bars depict 95 percent confidence intervals, which 
are partly a function of data density.
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The striking pattern of Figure 1, echoed on other questions, was a new finding. Initially it might 
have been dismissed as a peculiarity of these data. The hypothetical behind Figure 1, a twenty-
foot rise in sea level, is not a near-future threat. It corresponds to melting the entire Greenland 
Ice Sheet, and some respondents presumably are rejecting its plausibility rather than saying they 
really would not care if such a thing happened. But within a few years, similar 
education×politics interactions were noticed with diverse climate and environmental questions 
on half a dozen other surveys (McCright and Dunlap 2011; Hamilton 2011). Further replications 
followed, including analysis of later GSS data where the same polar questions were repeated. A 
science literacy×politics interaction similar to Figure 1 was observed with objectively-tested 
science literacy on the X axis in place of education: Concern about sea level and other changes 
increases with science literacy among liberals and moderates, but declines with science literacy 
among the most conservative (Hamilton et al. 2012). Cognitive studies have established the 
phenomenon of accepting or rejecting information selectively, in conformity with preexisting 
beliefs (Munro and Ditto 1997; Taber and Lodge 2006). Such biased assimilation could occur 
disproportionately among those nominally better informed, with consequences that particularly 
separate them on topics related to climate change (Corner et al. 2011; Kahan 2013).
The GSS discoveries inspired surveys with more detailed knowledge questions, including a 
series of statewide polls in New Hampshire (Hamilton 2012). Figure 2A charts responses pooled 
from five 2011–2014 New Hampshire surveys that asked:
Which of the following three statements do you think is more accurate? Over the past few years,  
the ice on the Arctic Ocean in late summer ...
covers less area than it did 30 years ago;
declined but then recovered to about the same area it had 30 years ago; or
covers more area than it did 30 years ago.
The first answer above (rotated in the actual interviews) is unambiguously correct. As measured 
from satellite imagery, late-summer Arctic sea ice area in recent years has fluctuated around 
levels more than a million square kilometers below those of 30 years before (Figure 2B). 
Encouragingly, 71 percent of the New Hampshire survey respondents answered this question 




Figure 2: Response to sea ice question on five New Hampshire surveys (A), and observed September 
ice area (B).
Although most people get this right, accuracy varies with politics. Figure 3 tracks the percentage 
of “less area” responses, showing the persistence of partisan divisions. Overall about 84 percent 
of Democrats, 74 percent of Independents, 68 percent of Republicans, and 50 percent of Tea 
Party supporters know or guess that Arctic sea ice has declined (definitions in Hamilton and 
Saito 2015). The gap between non-Tea Party Republicans and Independents is relatively narrow, 
compared with a wider gap separating non-Tea Party Republicans from Tea Party supporters.
Figure 3: Percentage of “ice declined” responses by political party and approximate date of five New 
Hampshire surveys.
3
Surveys in October of 2012, 2013 and 2014 took place shortly after Arctic sea ice area had 
reached its annual minimum. There was scientific and media discussion at the time regarding the 
record low ice cover in 2012, or its somewhat higher levels in 2013 and 2014. Our surveys 
reflect these physical events only through a dip in the proportion of “less ice” responses in 
October 2013. Responses by Democrats and Independents bounce back to previous levels in 
2014.
Arctic ice melting is an easy meme to recall from media reports, and one people might retain or 
dismiss depending on what they already believe about global warming. Consequently, responses 
to this question divide on political lines, and yet even among Tea Party supporters (who 
overwhelmingly reject anthropogenic climate change) half recognize the reality of Arctic ice 
decline. It is easy to find other survey questions, however, which have equally basic answers that 
are less memorable and cannot be deduced from ideology. For example, is the North Pole on thin 
ice over deep sea, or thick ice over land? What about the South Pole? Could sea ice or land ice 
potentially contribute more to sea level rise? On such questions the proportion of right answers 
drops sharply, and does not much correlate with politics.
Unlike ideologically-opaque polar knowledge, self-assessed understanding of climate change 
correlates more consistently with politics. Tea Party supporters, for example, rate their 
understanding the highest (Leiserowitz et al. 2011; Hamilton and Saito 2015). If political outlook 
filters or substitutes for information from science, that complicates the prospects for 
communicating about Arctic change. Survey results such as Figures 1 and 3 also highlight a 
middle ground, however, where science communication could be more direct.
Communicating with the general public about Arctic change encounters political and cultural 
challenges similar to those faced on broader science topics including evolution and climate 
change. Finding more effective science communication strategies is a focus of ongoing research, 
with divergent perspectives that could be characterized as top-down (divisions are driven by 
messaging from political, media or economic elites) or bottom-up (divisions reflect 
psychological, ideological or cultural identity). Some authors suggest that scientific consensus 
forms a “gateway belief” for accepting science information (Van der Linden et al. 2014), while 
others argue for an adaptive, culturally nuanced approach (Kahan forthcoming). Arctic change 
remains distant and abstract for most people, hence known through preconceptions, media or 
scientists. Its manifestations are not abstract for Arctic residents, however, whose voices may 
become more prominent.
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